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Ghaith, even claimed that al-Qaeda had a right to kill four million Americans, including two million children.
2 Such a grave menace requires a strong response. Yet the U.S. has so far waged only a one-dimensional war against al-Qaeda, fighting hard on one front when it should be fighting on four. Specifically, the Bush administration has focused heavily on an offensive campaign against al-Qaeda overseas while neglecting three other critical fronts: bolstering homeland defense, securing weapons and materials of mass destruction from possible theft or purchase by terrorists, and winning the war of ideas. And the administration has sometimes lost focus and done too little on the one front where it has been fighting, partly because it diverted itself into a costly and counterproductive sideshow in Iraq. The public credits President Bush for toughness on terror. In fact, however, his administration has pursued a half-hearted war on There must be no further diversions from the campaign against the main enemy--the alQaeda network and its jihadi allies. For example, a military confrontation with Syria, or Iran, or both--urged by some in Washington--would be a grave mistake.
Bottom line: even on the offensive, its favored mission, the Bush team has shown an uncertain hand and deviated counterproductively from its objective.
Front No. 2: The defensive
The Bush administration' s homeland defense effort has large holes. The CIA has been damaged by a campaign against CIA employees who were deemed unfriendly to the Bush administration. This campaign caused an exodus of able officers from the CIA when their expertise was badly needed.
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Instead of distributing the most funds to places that are most at risk of attack, U. S.
funding for homeland security often goes to low-priority pork barrel projects in places This situation reflects the administration' s decision to focus its efforts on the offensive while doing only enough on homeland security to give the appearance of action. At this point homeland security is more a palliative to public fear than a real security program.
Front No. 3: Securing Weapons of Mass Destruction
Vast nuclear and biological weapons and materials remain poorly secured in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Enough nuclear materials remain unsecured in Russia to make tens of thousands of Hiroshima-sized atomic bombs. Many Soviet nuclear and biologicalweapons scientists also remain underpaid or unemployed, ripe for hiring by terrorists.
Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have all failed to move strongly to lock down these materials and scientists. The U.S. spends only some $1. A strong-handed approach should also be taken toward securing WMD around the rest of the world, including poorly secured nuclear materials in Pakistan and in scores of research reactors elsewhere. During the Cold War the U.S. unwisely dispersed enough nuclear material to make perhaps 1,000 nuclear bombs to 43 countries around the world, starting in the 1950s and ending in 1988. The U.S. government has since made only lackadaisical efforts to recover these immensely dangerous materials, which are ripe for theft or illicit purchase by terrorists. These materials must be secured immediately.
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Front No. 4: The war of ideas
To defeat al-Qaeda the U.S. must reach a modus vivendi with the wider Muslim world.
The Islamist jihadi movement from which al-Qaeda grows must be reduced, isolated, and drained of energy. This requires changing the terms of debate in the Muslim world, channeling discussion in less hostile directions.
To do this the U.S. must develop and use its power to persuade and its power to make peace. The jihadis feed on political and historical myths and lies. This failure of public diplomacy reflects the Bush administration' s macho approach to foreign policy. It believes that friends abroad are won by using the mailed fist and the mailed fist alone. Allies are gained by instilling fear, not respect. The Caligula theory of statecraft--"let them hate us as long as they fear us"--is believed and applied. Reasoning with others is assumed to be pointless, as others are immoral cowards who understand only threat of force.
Public diplomacy is for sissies. This school yard bully attitude has led the administration into grave errors of both commission (the over-use of force and threat of force) and omission, including a failure to use the potent weapon of public diplomacy. The United States has powerful skills of persuasion when it chooses to use them, but the Bush team has failed to use them.
Will the Islamic world engage in debate about historical truth? Will it agree that it must rest its claims on valid history? The Koran says it must: "Believers, if an evil-doer brings you a piece of news, inquire first into its truth, lest you should wrong others unwittingly and then regret your action." The United States should embrace this teaching and propose that both Neither side will accept terms outside these parameters. Israel will never agree to a large return 34 of refugees to Israel; Palestinian insistence on a large return would torpedo peace. And the Palestinians will accept no deal that they cannot credibly claim involves full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. Egypt' s Anwar Sadat and Jordan' s King Hussein both got full Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian and Jordanian territory in exchange for full peace in their earlier peace deals with Israel, and today' s Palestinian leaders need to claim that they won the same terms to quiet their own radicals, who will otherwise accuse them of surrendering the national cause by accepting second-best treatment-- administration is not pursuing Israeli-Palestinian peace with conviction.
To move toward peace Washington should frame its own final-status peace plan and use carrots and sticks to persuade both sides to agree. This will put the opponents of peace on both sides on the defensive. Most important, it will corner the radical Palestinian group
Hamas by exposing its extremism as an obstacle to a just peace. Most Palestinians now want a two-state solution. Hamas, which won Palestinian parliamentary elections in January 2006, rejects a two-state solution and instead seeks Israel' s destruction. It has argued that its extremism does little harm to its followers because the two-state solution that its extremism prevents was never in the cards. The U.S. can destroy this argument by making clear that it will lead matters to just such a peace if the two sides will cooperate. Hamas will then be forced to bend toward peace or lose power. This scheme is an intelligent alternative to the four-front scheme that I used above. It is tied directly to the logic of terrorist organizational sustenance. This makes it especially useful for identifying tactics that will defeat terrorist networks.
However, the Bush policy against al-Qaeda looks inadequate when measured against this scheme as well. The administration is moving firmly against only four vulnerabilities (numbers 1, 2, 4, and 5--al-Qaeda leadership, al-Qaeda safe-havens, and al-Qaeda ability to communicate and move). The strategy is good but the execution is poor. It still appears by this accounting that the Bush administration is waging a one-dimensional war on terror.
Needed: large policy innovation.
Winning the war on terror will require large innovation in U.S. national security policy.
The U.S. should put relatively less resources into traditional military functions--army, navy, air force--and far more resources into counterterror functions. These include intelligence, homeland security, diplomacy to lock down loose nukes and bioweapons around the world, public diplomacy, diplomacy to end conflicts that breed terror--including the Israeli-Arab conflict and the conflicts in Kashmir and Chechnya--and nation building and saving failed states, to deny terrorists the haven-states they need to build their organizations. But the organizations that carry out these functions--U.S. intelligence agencies, local law enforcement, Ibid. This figure omits spending on security for 40 Defense Department installations in the U.S.
and so forth--are politically weak in Washington, so they lose out in Washington budget battles. And like all governments the U.S. government resists innovation, so the changes needed to defeat al-Qaeda face large political obstacles. Can the U.S. government innovate to the extent required?
Americans should want to hear the pulling and hauling of vast turf fights in Washington.
This would tell them that innovation in security policy was underway--that resources and authority were being transferred from yesterday' s Cold-War-oriented agencies to
Counterterror-oriented agencies.
Instead the tenor of national security policy in Washington is largely business-as-usual.
The agencies that would lead in a serious war on al-Qaeda continue to take a far back seat to national defense spending (ex-CTR) is 11 times U.S. spending on homeland security, 337 times U. S. spending on locking down nuclear weapons and materials, and 325 times U. S.
spending on the war of ideas. The spread of bioweapons and the resulting risk of bioterror pose a particular danger.
Bioweapons are far cheaper to make than nuclear weapons so even non-state terrorist actors may someday be able to make them. Terrorists are far harder to deter than states, so terrorist possession of bioweapons (or another WMD) is far more worrying than state possession of bioweapons. Bioweapons can be used anonymously, which also complicates efforts to deter their use. And establishing an arms control regime to control bioweapons seems very difficult--far harder than a nuclear arms control regime--as bioweapons programs have no clear signature that distinguishes them from legitimate biomedical research programs.
In the future the advance of bioscience will magnify this danger, as genetic engineering raises the danger that terrorists can design and make their own superlethal pathogens.
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Some, including myself, were lulled about the bioterror danger before 9/11 partly because the United States and most other major powers were uninterested in developing bioweapons. (The U.S. abandoned its offensive bioweapons program in 1969). We inferred from this that bioweapons were not very useful and so would not be developed or used. But while bioweapons may be unuseful to states, they are quite useful to terrorists who seek vast destruction instead of finite military objectives. The appearance of skilled terrorist groups that aspire to mass murder, like al-Qaeda, means that a new class of potential bioweapons users has appeared. These weapons now have customers.
Many were also lulled by the world' s success in surviving the nuclear revolution. They assumed that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons were all of a piece--all were "weapons of mass destruction"--and that measures that worked with one (arms control, deterrence) would What implications would follow from the democratization of the power to destroy?
Human history shows that the arrangement of power shapes politics among states and groups.
When the arrangement of power is benign, there is peace. When it is malignant violence prevails. Toxic power arrangements bring out the beast in us. They create fears and temptations that erase the veneer of civilization. For example, before 1914 the governments of Europe believed that conquest was easy. This belief led them to think their countries were insecure, and that aggressive policies could remedy this insecurity. Hence they pursued highly aggressive policies toward one another. World War I soon exploded. That war stemmed in large part from perceptions of the arrangement of power.
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The democratization of the power to destroy will create a far more dangerous arrangement of power than the arrangements that led to the two world wars. It will pose conundrums to which students of security have no obvious remedies. The danger of WMD terror will greatly expand.
We must recognize, therefore, that we are in an enduring struggle against terror and adapt accordingly. Business-as-usual will not suffice. One-dimensional policies will not suffice. A wholesale transformation of U.S. national security policy is required.
